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In this paper, I give a semantic account of the grammaticality of the negative particle not
with noun phrases in English. On the way to developing my solution, I explore a few previous
attempts at this problem, including an extension of Horn’s discussion of the availability of NEG-Q
readings (Horn, 1989) and Barwise and Cooper’s treatment of this phenomenon within the
generalized quantifiers approach (Barwise & Cooper, 1981). I will show that while both of these
approaches provide interesting insights, neither approach is an adequate solution. My solution
focuses on the nature of the complement of the noun phrase. After a thorough investigation of a
large data set, I conclude that negation of a noun phrase is possible if and only if the size of the
complement of the noun phrase is representable by a continuous set of values, and the noun
phrase contains no other aspect of its meaning that can be negated.

In English, there are several instances where not can grammatically negate the subject of a
sentence. For example, the following sentences are grammatical:
(1) a. Not everyone can afford a fifty dollar haircut.
b. Not many discus throwers can claim to have accomplished such a feat.
c. Not one thing was left untouched by the wrath of the tornado.
The question one might be prone to ask is, can all noun phrases be negated with not ? Negation of
the subject of a sentence with not is not syntactically valid if the subject does not contain a
quantified noun phrase1 . Thus, a sentence such as *Not Salome came to the party is
ungrammatical, whereas we have seen in (1) above that several sentences with quantified noun
phrases are in fact grammatical. However, not all sentences containing not modifying a quantified
noun phrase subject are grammatical. Consider the following examples in (2):
(2) a. *Not some people came to my party last week.
b. *Not several events are planned for that weekend.
c. *Not each company is expected to present a quarterly report.
Now one may ask, exactly which quantified noun phrases can not negate? Several
researchers who have studied the general topic of negation have commented on the fact that

1

There are other instances where not can negate the subject of a sentence. These cases are when not is used in
conjunction with but (or and ). Doran (1997) states that the not...but construction is a case of a complex
conjunction, as opposed to the usage of not as a modifier of noun phrases or quantifiers, as discussed in this essay.
I assume that this model is an accurate description of the behavior, and I will not discuss it further in this essay.

every x can be negated by not, and yet *not some x is ungrammatical. Horn (1989) discusses the
work of many linguists and philosophers on this topic, most importantly Jespersen (1917, 1924),
Sapir (1930), Carden (1972), and Horn (1972), each of whom focus on the every/some
distinction. Within the realm of logic, it is quite easy to overlook other quantifiers and focus on the
distinctions between every and some. However, these analyses do not take into consideration the
full breadth of the issue for natural language.
In terms of the larger picture, Horn (1989) and Barwise & Cooper (1981) offer possible
solutions to the problem of classifying the entire set of quantifiers in terms of their ability to be
negated. Horn presents a sketch of a solution to the problem, explaining the classification of
quantifiers as a result of the availability of a one-word lexical item, a lexical item that expresses a
meaning equivalent to what would be the meaning of the negated quantified noun phrase. Horn
states that “NEG-Q will be available for those predicate denials which do not have a lexicalized
paraphrase” (p.499). Barwise and Cooper consider a wider range of examples, and conclude that
there may be a different explanation for almost every case of the unavailability of a negated
quantifier reading.
My mission in this paper is to develop a unified analysis of the grouping of quantifiers
according to their ability to be negated by not. In the process, I will draw on portions of various
analyses of quantifiers (Barwise & Cooper, 1981; Keenan & Stavi, 1986; Tottie, 1991) and
negation (Horn, 1989, and those cited in Horn). My analysis rests on the claim that negation by
not is only allowed when the denotation of the negated noun phrase has a readily definable
interpretation; more specifically, the set of possible sizes for the set denoted by the negated noun
phrase must be a continuous range of values. On our way to solidifying this notion, we must
consider in greater detail the theories Horn (1989) and Barwise & Cooper (1981) have developed
to explain this phenomenon. To begin our investigation, however, we must first gain a sense of
exactly which quantified noun phrases can be negated by not.

Classifying Quantifiers:

A Data Sample

The following table displays the behavior of not with different kinds of noun phrases.
______________________________________________________________________________
Table 1. Example sentences demonstrating when it is grammatical (or interpretable) to negate a
noun phrase with not. Note the contrasts in behavior between determiners that are
usually grouped together, such as every/each/all.
Grammatical
Ungrammatical
1. Not every company expects to report
10. *Not each citizen files a tax return.
increased earnings.
2. Not all of NASA’s space-science work
will be so auspicious.
3. Not a peso is offered.
11. *Not some pesos are offered.
4. Not one thing in the house is where it is
supposed to be.
5. Not many people came to the meeting
12. *Not several people came to the
last week.
meeting last week.
6. Not any person can just walk right in
there and get what they want.
7. Not more than half of the team showed 13. *Not most of the team showed up last
up last Friday.
Friday.
8. Not more than 200 people attended the 14. *Not few people left.
opening gala celebration.
15. *Not no man left.
9. Not less than one million people
16. *Not the man walked into the store.
enjoy listening to ABBA Gold every day. 17. *Not John came on time.
______________________________________________________________________________
The most important thing to note about Table 1 is that several determiners that are normally
grouped together in terms of their semantic behavior display opposite trends in grammaticality
when used in coordination with negation. For example, Barwise & Cooper (1981) do not
distinguish between every, each, and all, since all three share the same values for the semantic
features Barwise & Cooper have determined are crucial for classifying the behavior of determiners
(e.g., all three are +strong, indefinite, and monotonically increasing). However, note that every x
and all x can be part of a negated noun phrase, while each x cannot be negated in this manner.
Additionally, other semantic groupings Barwise & Cooper adopt, such as some/a and
many/several, also fail to hold in terms of their ability to be negated. Perhaps most intriguing is the
fact that more than half x can be negated, while not most x is ungrammatical.

Horn (1989):

NEG-Q readings, scope, and lexical entries

In the concluding chapter of his book, A Natural History of Negation, Horn (1989)
discusses the asymmetry in the possible readings for the scope of negation in sentences containing
universal and particular quantification (see examples (3) and (4) below, taken from Horn, p. 497).
In (3a), the quantifier is a universal, and the negation can have either wide scope over the
quantifier, or narrow scope, which would entail scope over the ‘predicate’ portion of the sentence.
In (4), the negation can only have scope over the ‘predicate’ portion. It is highly unlikely that
anyone would interpret (4a) to mean the same thing as (4b), however (3b) is clearly one of the
possible interpretations of (3a). Horn, following the notation of Carden (1970), terms the wide
scope negation NEG-Q (~Q), and the narrow scope reading NEG-V (Q~).
(3)
(4)

a.
b.
a.
b.

Everybody didn’t come.
Not everybody came.
Somebody didn’t come.
Nobody came.

Horn also notes that the NEG-Q reading for particular quantifiers is not always unavailable. NEGQ readings for particular quantifiers may be available in the case of “metalinguistic or second
instance negation” (p.496). Horn notes that in these cases, “Crucially, each ease involves the
disappointment of an expectation assumed to be shared by speaker and addressee” (p.494). An
example of metalinguistic negation where the NEG-Q reading is available for some appears in (5)
below.
(5) She swung round, she took two strides to him, waiting for someone to stop her, but
someone didn’t. (from John Le Carré’s The Little Drummer Girl, quoted in Horn,
1989)
However, since the wide-scope reading of negation in particular sentences is rather unusual, Horn
focuses on explaining the usual apparent asymmetry between the behavior of every and some
with negation.
The crux of Horn’s explanation for this asymmetry lies in what he calls Nexal Not, “a
preference for overt negation to surface in its unmarked (nexal, predicate denial) position, as a
particle or inflection on the finite verb or auxiliary” (p.498). Following from this, Horn states that
inherently negative quantifiers (e.g., nobody, none of the x, etc.) exhibit a greater ability to restrict

the NEG-Q reading in sentences like (4a), than strongly marked negated quantifiers (e.g., not
everyone ) exhibit for examples like (3a). Hence, we can interpret both the NEG-Q and NEG-V
readings in (3a), but the NEG-Q reading is unavailable for (4a).
A prediction that arises from this argument is that a predicate denial will only be
interpretable as a NEG-Q reading in the absence of a lexicalized paraphrase for the denial. Horn
presents a few examples, among them are the examples in (4a,b) and in (6).
(6)

a. Many students aren’t happy during midterms.
b. Few students are happy during midterms.

The argument is that the NEG-Q reading of (6a) is blocked by the existence of a lexicalized
negative quantifier with an equivalent interpretation (i.e., not many = few ). While Horn’s
arguments seem to adequately (and elegantly) explain the availability of NEG-Q and NEG-V
readings for predicate denials, his theory leaves many questions about the current investigation
unanswered.
How does Horn’s analysis extend to an analysis of the current question of when it is
grammatical to negate a noun phrase? Clearly, the two problems are closely tied. However, when
Horn discusses the availability of the NEG-Q reading of some...not sentences, he essentially
overlooks the reality that not only is the NEG-Q reading unavailable, the construction *Not some x
is in fact ungrammatical. Why is it ungrammatical? Are we to infer that we cannot say not some x
because of the existence of a lexicalized negative quantifier with the same meaning (for example,
nobody = not somebody )? If this is a reasonable inference, then it quickly becomes apparent that
an extension of Horn’s analysis cannot adequately explain the current problem.
The first problem arises if we take a closer look at the meaning of a sentence like (7).
(7) *Not somebody came.
Do we understand this sentence to mean Nobody came ? If we can force ourselves to comprehend
the sentence at all, we will most likely interpret (7) as Nobody came . But is it also possible that
this sentence could be interpreted as Everybody came ? Take for example the following possible
utterances.

(8) Not somebody came... nobody came.
(9) Not somebody came... everybody came.
Although (8) and (9) use a special type of ‘conjunction’ negation (see footnote 1), both sentences,
with proper stress on the underlined portions, are reasonable utterances. Thus, one would no
longer be willing to accept the assertion that not somebody = nobody. Even if one is willing to
accept that not somebody = nobody, then what is the explanation for why the construction not
somebody is ungrammatical? Could it not be interpreted simply as nobody came? Is it
ungrammatical because there exists an inherently negative quantifier that expresses the same
meaning? This does not seem to be a satisfactory explanation, as we will soon see.
Consider the following sentences containing negated noun phrases.
(10) *Not some people came to the party.
(11) Not many people came to the party.
(12) *Not most people came to the party.
For (10), we might argue that it is ungrammatical because we could instead say Nobody came to
the party, where the meaning of not some people could be expressed by the less marked,
inherently negative nobody. However, according to Horn, (11) could be expressed equivalently
by Few people came to the party. Why, then, is (11) clearly acceptable? If we support an
extension of Horn’s analysis, should it not be ungrammatical? Also, note that (12) is
ungrammatical, although there appears to be no inherently negative lexical item that is equivalent to
not most. One might be tempted to say that not most = less than half, however we run into the
same problem we experienced with interpreting not some. Can not most in (12) also be
interpreted as everyone or more than most ? Additionally, is less than half an inherently negative
quantifier? Thus, it seems that an extension of Horn’s analysis is inadequate for explaining when a
noun phrase can be preceded overtly by negation in an English sentence.

Barwise & Cooper (1981): Subsection 4.11- Negation of Noun Phrases and Duals
As opposed to the general solution that an extension of Horn’s account would supply for
the current problem, Barwise & Cooper (1981) offer a somewhat disjoint account of the
grammaticality of negating noun phrases. Using a data set very similar to the one presented in
Table 1, the generalizations B&C develop in this section deal with what they define as the dual of a
quantifier, as well as with the monotonicity of the determiner involved in the negated noun phrase.
B&C state that these generalizations are the only apparent semantic generalizations to be made,
since “this distribution [of grammatical negation of NPs] cannot be explained purely in terms of
the semantics of quantifiers” (p.197). As support for this claim, they cite the difference in
behavior between every, all, and each (see Table 1, #1, 2, and 10). Now let’s take a closer look
at the solutions they proposed.
Part of the solution B&C propose can be summarized with their ‘Language Universal 9’:
U9. Constraint on negating self-dual and monotonically decreasing quantifiers. If a
language has a syntactic construction whose semantic function is to negate a quantifier,
then this construction will not be used with NP’s expressing monotonically decreasing or
self-dual quantifiers.
The first specification of this constraint deals with monotonically decreasing quantifiers. The
argument is that for every negated monotonically decreasing quantifier, there exists a non-negative
monotonically increasing quantifier that expresses an equivalent meaning (derived from B&C’s
Universal 5, p.186). Applying this to our data set in Table 1, B&C would say that instead of
expressing #14 and #15 as written, we could simply say: Many people left and some people left .
The second specification of this constraint focuses on the concept of a dual of a quantifier.
B&C define the dual of a quantifier Q on E as, “the quantifier Q defined by Q = {X E | (E - X
Q}, i.e. Q = ~(Q~) = (~Q)~. If Q = Q then Q is called self-dual “ (p.197). As an example,
||every man|| is the dual of ||some man|| (the reverse is also true). If a quantifier Q is self-dual
then the wide scope reading for the negation is equal to the narrow scope reading (essentially ~Q =
Q~). B&C assert that in the case of a self-dual quantifier, using a specific syntactic construction to
show that negation has wide scope over the quantified noun phrase is unnecessary. The sentences

in #16 and #17 in Table 1 contain self-dual quantifiers (the man and John ), and thus the negated
noun phrase constructions should be prohibited in these cases.
In terms of the other examples in Table 1, B&C also mention as an aside that it is possible
that #10 and #11 are unacceptable because of the tendency of each and some to prefer wide scope.
They discuss example #13, but offer no solution. This section of their paper (subsection 4.11)
seems to be focusing on defining new terms and quantifier universals within the realm of the
theory of generalized quantifiers, rather than on providing a general solution to the specific
problem of when noun phrases can be negated. As with the proposed extension of Horn’s
analysis, B&C’s solution is questionable in some respects and leaves parts of the data set
unexplained.
The first question the analysis raises is the question of the existence of a ‘linguistic
economy’ that would prohibit a syntactic construction expressing a negated monotonically
decreasing quantifier because there exists a monotonically increasing quantifier that could express
the same meaning. There are many instances in natural language where there are several different
syntactic ways of expressing approximately the same meaning. Is negation a special instance of
linguistic economy? Another question one could ask about this proposed explanation is whether
we would in fact interpret *Not few men left, to mean Many men left, as B&C propose (many is
the monotonically increasing quantifier that corresponds to not few, where few is a monotonically
decreasing quantifier). This is reminiscent of my argument against the proposition that not
somebody = nobody. Consider the following examples, akin to (8) and (9) above.
(13) Not few men left ... many men left.
(14) Not few men left ... no men left.
Presumably, both (13) and (14) are plausible utterances (with stress placed on the underlined
portions), although (13) may perhaps be the more common interpretation (that is, if we can
interpret *Not few men left at all). Can we then say then definitely say that not few = many ?
Thus, it seems that the constraint that focuses on monotonicity is not a satisfactory partial
explanation for the current problem.

The biggest hole left open by their argument is the question of the motivation behind the
statement that some and each prefer wide scope readings. They make this claim in a parenthetical
statement with no supporting evidence, and so they did not give a good idea why this is true nor
why it is applicable in this situation. B&C are implying by this statement that negation cannot
have wide scope over the quantifiers each x and some x. This may very well be true, however
they provide no insight into why this is true2. B&C’s explanation appears to be an inadequate
partial solution, and when one considers that B&C cannot explain why not most x is
ungrammatical, one is ever more anxious to search for a solution that might handle all of the
examples discussed thus far.
A Unified Approach to the Negation of Noun Phrases
I began this project with the hope that there might be some generalization to be made that
would distinguish between grammatical and ungrammatical instances of negating noun phrases. I
have surmised that a generalization can be made concerning the fact that the quantifiers in the
grammatical sentences exhibit the same underlying property that allows them to be legally negated
by not. To form an initial statement of this generalization, let’s take a closer look at the cases of
negating some and every.
NOT EVERY vs *NOT SOME

Consider again the following pairs of sentences from Table 1:
#1 Not every company expects to report increased earnings.
#11 *Not some pesos are offered.
In the case of example #1, there was an expectation or a belief present in the discourse (whether it
be on the part of the addressee or some unnamed ‘cultural entity’) that every company expects to
report increased earnings. The speaker is conveying to the addressee that the set of companies that
expect to report increased earnings is not the total set of companies. One could say that the size of
2

This portion of the analysis is very similar to Horn’s analysis of why some...not sentences cannot have the NEGQ reading. Horn would say that the wide scope reading is prohibited or restricted by the existence of an inherently
negative lexicalized quantifier that expresses the same meaning. The error in an extension of Horn’s theory becomes
even more apparent when we begin to consider what the equivalent of not each x might be. Some x does not quite
seem to be adequate, and when we continue to consider the issue, we come up empty.

the set that expects to report increased earnings is less than the size of the entire set of companies.
If we let the size of the entire set of companies under consideration in the discourse be N, then the
size of the set that expects to report increased earnings is some value less than N, namely:
(15) 0 < |{companies that expect to report increased earnings}| < N
When we consider example #11 in this light, the situation is not so transparent. What
exactly does *not some denote? When considering Horn’s analysis, I observed that although the
most readily apparent interpretation of not some is no, it is also possible that not some can mean
every. Given the context of the bare not some construction3, it is difficult to distinguish whether
the size of the set of pesos that are offered is less than or greater than the size of some pesos (the
size of some pesos is the amount of pesos anticipated to be offered by the person who is the
source of the original discourse expectation). If we let the total amount of pesos in this portion of
the universe be M, then (16) is the analogous representation of the size of not some.
(16) |{pesos to be offered}| = 0 or M
This ambiguity is precisely the reason why we cannot negate noun phrases that contain the
determiner some.
The distinction between the grammaticality of not every and the ungrammaticality of not
some leads us to make the following proposition.
(Proposition 1). A quantifier Q can be grammatically negated by not if and only if there
exists a continuous set of possible values for the size of the negated quantified set.
We can then see that every x can be negated since the size of the denotation of not every x is
[0, N-1], while the size of not some x is 0 or N, and so some x cannot be negated (where N
signifies the cardinality of the entire set of x s under consideration). Let us now consider how
Proposition 1 fares with the remainder of the data set in Table 1.

3

By using the term bare, I meant to indicate that the not is not being used as part of a complex conjunction such
as not...but, as was used to clarify the meaning of not some in examples (8) & (9) above.

FALLING IN LINE: ALL, MORE THAN X, LESS THAN X, FEW; MANY vs. SEVERAL; MORE THAN
HALF vs. MOST

ALL.

The behavior of all with negation is exactly parallel to that of every, as one might

expect. In the following sentence from Table 1, the amount of ‘NASA’s work that will be so
auspicious’ is some value from 0 to N-1, where N signifies the total size of all of NASA’s spacescience work. Thus, all can be grammatically negated by not since the size of its negated
quantified set is a continuous range of values, [0, N-1].
#2 Not all of NASA’s space-science work will be so auspicious, though.
MORE THAN X, LESS THAN X, FEW Y.

It is readily apparent why the first and second of

these quantifiers are grammatical when negated, and the third is ungrammatical. Consider again
the following examples from Table 1:
#8 Not more than 200 people attended the opening gala celebration.
#9 Not less than one million people enjoy listening to ABBA Gold every day.
#14 *Not few people came to the meeting.
During the discussion of Barwise & Cooper’s (1981) analysis, I suggested that not few could
mean both no and many (although intuition may lead one to believe that many is the more likely
interpretation). As was the case with some, the size of the set denoted by the negation of few has
two possible values, zero or many. We see that few y does not satisfy the conditions put forth by
Proposition 1, and therefore, it cannot be negated by not.
For examples #8, we can quickly see that the size of the set of people that ‘attended the
opening gala celebration’ is somewhere from zero to 200, [0, 200]. Additionally, for example #9,
the size of the set of people that ‘enjoy listening to ABBA Gold every day’ is somewhere between
one million and the total human population (= N), or [1,000,000, N]. We see that in both cases,
there exists a continuous set of natural numbers that expresses the possible size of the set denoted
by the negated quantifier, and so more than x and less than x can be grammatically negated in
subject position.
MANY vs. SEVERAL.

As noted earlier, the contrast in grammaticality between the negated

many and the negated several is somewhat surprising considering the fact that their semantic

behavior has been equated in other quantifier analyses (e.g., Barwise & Cooper, 1981).
However, we can utilize Proposition 1 to tease apart the cause of the disparity. The first step
toward understanding the disparity is to ponder the precise difference in meaning between many
and several.
Clearly, both many and several convey that the quantified set has a value somewhat
greater than zero. According to Keenan & Stavi (1986), the communicative utility of sentences
containing many “does not lie in what they literally say about the world” (p.258). They assert that
the speaker is expressing a “value judgment” of the size of the subject involved, and that the use of
the word many is used to indicate that the size is significant in the speaker’s world view.
Essentially, many can denote a set of size anywhere from two to the size of the total set,
depending on the given situation, although the speaker is clearly not aware of the exact size. One
could also say that the denotation of several is strictly a function of a speaker’s arbitrary measure,
although the difference between the two lies in the upper bound on their denotations. In opposition
to many, several is used to indicate a size of somewhere from two or three to some value less than
the total size of X. In summary, both many and several are vague quantifiers, each can be used to
indicate that the number involved is significant in some respect, but only many can be used to
possibly indicate that a total set was involved.
The difference between many x and several x results in a difference in the grammaticality
of their corresponding negating quantifiers. Reconsider sentences #5 and #12 from Table 1.
#5 Not many people came to the meeting last week.
#12 *Not several people came to the meeting last week.
In #12, note that there are two possible values for the size of the set denoted by not several, less
than the value for several given by the discourse, or greater than that value. This is very similar to
the cases of few and some. Clearly, both (17a) and (17b) are acceptable possible interpretations
of not several in #12. It is possible that not several people indicates every person (17b), since
several cannot be used to indicate the entire set. Additionally, (17b) provides evidence that the
upper bound on the value of many is greater than the upper bound on several.

(17)

a. Not several people came ... few / no people came.
b. Not several people came ... everybody / (many people) came.

The range of sizes for the set denoted by not several is not a continuous set of values (the size is
either less than or greater than the value of several ), and so several cannot be negated.
On the other hand, the size of the set denoted by not many cannot be more than many,
since it is possible that many indicated the size of the entire set (many may possibly equal all, so
not many ≠all ). Note the examples in (18) below. The clarification in (18a) sounds redundant,
whereas the clarification in (18b) is simply not appropriate.
(18)

a. Not many people came ... few people came.
b. *Not many people came ... everyone came.

Hence, not many can only denote a set of size less than the value given for many by the discourse
(if this value is M, in terms of #5, 0 < |{people who came to the meeting last week}| < M,
although the size is most likely considerably closer to 0 than to M). This set is a continuous set of
values, and so many can be grammatically negated.
MORE THAN HALF vs. MOST.

The upper bounds on the denotations of more than half and

most plays a key role in the ability of more than half x to be negated, while not most is
ungrammatical. A speaker that utters either of these quantifiers must be aware of the approximate
total size of the set of objects X in order to be using them in the appropriate manner (i.e., following
the Maxim of Quality, Grice (1975)). When a speaker uses more than half x, the addressee
understands that the size of the set denoted by more than half x could be anywhere from one
greater than half of |x| to the size of the entire set. However, most means anywhere from greater
than 50% of the set to some value less than 100% of the set, depending on the given situation. So,
when we try to negate most, it is possible that not most could mean more than most or less than
most , since most cannot indicate that the total set was involved4 . Again, we find that the
negation of a quantifier is ungrammatical exactly when the set that contains the possible values for
4

Note that most can be used logically to indicate all, or 100% of the set. However, in a normal discourse, if a
speaker wants to indicate that 100% of the set has some property, then the speaker would use every or all. By
using most, the speaker may not succeed in conveying the necessary information to the addressee, thereby violating
Grice’s Maxims (Grice, 1975). The use of most to indicate all is exceptional, and therefore we are considering the
standard use of most, which is to indicate anywhere from more than 50% to less than 100% of the set.

the size of the set denoted by the negated quantifier is not a continuous set of positive integral
values. As expected, since more than half denotes a set of size anywhere from >50% to 100% of
the set (i.e., there are no ‘two sides’ to more than half ), the possible values for the size of the
negated quantifier is a closed, continuous set of values, namely [0, | N/2 | ], and so the negation is
grammatical.
FRINGE POSSIBILITIES: ANY and BOTH
ANY. The argument for why any

can be grammatically negated also supports Proposition

1, although the precise ‘size’ of the negated set is not so much at issue. To get an idea of the
denotation of not any, Tottie (1991) notes that, “In present-day-English it is only normal to use
not-negation at the beginning of a sentence if the meaning is ‘not just any’” (p.102). We can
extend this statement to assert that a speaker uses the phrase not any x to indicate that they have a
specific set of individuals in mind who in fact can have the property mentioned in the sentence. To
make this clear, consider example (19) below.
(19) Not anybody is allowed to shake hands with the Queen. [from Tottie, 1991, p.102]
In this example, the speaker means to indicate that nobody, except a very specific group of people
(possibly only foreign diplomats) is allowed to shake hands with the Queen. With each use of not
any x, the negated quantified noun phrase denotes a specific, closed set. This falls in line with
Proposition 1 in that the range of possible values for the size of the negated set is closed and
continuous. Thus, not any x is grammatical.
BOTH.

The grammaticality of not both x also supports Proposition 1, but like any, it is

slightly different than the previous examples considered in that the size of the negated set is a fixed
value. Unlike any, however, the speaker who uses not both either intentionally or unintentionally
ambiguates the subject of the sentence. Consider the following example.
(20) Not both David and Amy came to my party.
The speaker of (20) intends to deny the assertion that the two people mentioned, David and Amy,
came to her party. The addressee is to infer that one person, and not the other, did in fact come to
the party. The identity of the person who came to her party is ambiguous, however this is

unimportant in terms of the ability of both to be negated. The set of possible values for the size of
the negated set is closed and continuous, in fact the set is equal to {1}, and so the negation of both
x is grammatical.
DISCOURSE FACTORS: CARDINALS vs A and ONE; NO

At this point, it may have occurred to the reader that if the denotation of the determiner is
sandwiched somewhere between zero and the total size of the set involved (and does not include
either of those ends), then the determiner cannot be grammatically negated. Thus, one would
expect that all cardinal determiners that do not equal zero should be ungrammatical when negated.
This is generally true. Take for example (21) below.
(21) *Not two/twenty/300 hundred people came to the movie debut.
However, if the determiner denotes a set of size one, the negation is grammatical.
(22) Not one/a person came to the movie debut.
The grammaticality of not one x is rather unexpected, considering the consistency of the data
discussed up to this point. However, it is possible that (22) is only grammatical because it has
been established among the speakers of the language that this kind of quantifier indicates none, or a
set of size zero. This is evidenced by the fact that when sentences like (22) are spoken,
considerable stress is placed on the determiner, as if to indicate a special interpretation. This
emphasis is generally absent in the other cases of grammatical noun phrase negation (not every, not
all, not many, not less/more than n) where the range of values for the size of the negated quantified
set is unambiguous. Also consider that one can coerce a ‘more than one’ interpretation from not
one, if a large amount of stress is placed on one, and a clarifying phrase is added.
(23) Not one person came to the movie debut, (how could you say such a thing?),
hundreds came.
We can see that the ‘no one’ or ‘none’ interpretation of not one is difficult to reverse, and also the
meaning of not a is such that it cannot possibly be reversed. Note that in reading (22), if the stress
on the determiner is absent, the sentence will appear ungrammatical.

To account for these cases, we will have to alter Proposition 1 slightly. The following
needs to be added:
Addition to Proposition 1: Negation of a quantifier is also legal if the set of possible
values for the size of the negated set is established unambiguously within the
discourse of the language.
The fact that not no is ungrammatical (#15 in Table 1) is somewhat puzzling in terms of
Proposition 1. We understand no X to indicate a set of size zero, and thus the size of the negation
of no should be any of the values between one and the total size of the set of Xs. However, the
use of not no is ungrammatical, although its meaning, upon careful consideration, is
unambiguous. There are two closely related possible reasons for this disparity. Within natural
language, there seems to be a limitation on having two negative elements modifying the same entity
within a sentence. This avoidance of double negatives may also be invoked because of the blatant
flouting of any sense of linguistic economy. Using two negative morphemes in a row could be
easily by-passed by using a single, non-marked positive quantifier such as some 5 .
EXTENDING PROPOSITION 1: EACH, THE INDIVIDUATOR

The last determiner I will discuss in this paper is each. Each x is a special quantifier in that
it not only quantifies X, but it also describes a manner in which the members of X are related to the
predicate of the sentence. Take for example the following sentence.
(24) Each citizen is required to pay taxes.
Each indicates that every member of the set of citizens is required to pay taxes. In addition, each
establishes that the citizens must pay taxes individually, that the action cannot be performed as a
group. The ‘individuating’ portion of the meaning of each is a necessary component of its
meaning. This is not the case with the other universal quantifiers, every and all.; these universals
are unspecified in terms of ‘manner’. The sentence ‘Everybody went to the game’ could mean that
the people went in one large group, different small groups, or individually.
5 Admittedly, this explanation is sort of a hybrid of parts of both Horn’s (1989) and Barwise &Cooper’s (1981) analyses.

The negation of ‘no’ is technically, or logically, sound. However, the constraints of natural language stray from the
constraints of logic, and this is a brilliant case of this fact. The morphosyntax rejects ‘not no’ not because it is
uninterpretable, per se, but because there is a restriction against the use of two negative morphemes on a single entity.

The difference between each and every/all explains the fact that not each is
ungrammatical, while not every/all is perfectly acceptable. With not each, it is unclear whether the
negation negates the universal quantification portion of each or the manner or ‘individuating’
portion of each. Witness the following clarification examples, with stress placed on the underlined
portions.
(25)

a. Not each company is expected to pay taxes....only a few are required to pay
them this quarter.
b. Not each company is expected to pay taxes....the companies are all expected to
pay the tax as a group.

The ambiguity of the negation of each leads to its ungrammaticality. This last example prompts us
to further refine and finalize Proposition 1.
Proposition 1
A quantifier Q can be negated by not if and only if there exists a continuous set of possible
values for the size of the negated quantified set, and Q contains no other aspect of its
meaning, other than the quantifying aspect, that could also be negated. Negation of a
quantifier is also legal if the set of possible values for the size of the negated set is
established unambiguously within the discourse of the language.
Conclusions and Future Research
At the start of this investigation, I introduced several examples of negation of noun phrases
in subject position. After presenting a wide range of examples, I then proceeded to explore the
adequacy of the analyses of Horn (1989) and Barwise & Cooper (1981) for explaining the patterns
in the data. Horn’s discussion focused on the availability of NEG-Q and NEG-V readings for
sentences of the form Q...not. An extension of Horn’s analysis suggested that noun phrases
would only allow negation if there did not already exist an inherently negative lexical item that
expressed an equivalent meaning. A discussion of the two possible meanings for not some , and
other problems with the analysis, led me to abandon an extension of Horn’s analysis as a plausible
solution to the problem. After that, I presented the analysis of Barwise & Cooper (1981), which
focused on using monotonicity and the self-dual to determine which noun phrases cannot be
negated. I proceeded to demonstrate that Barwise & Cooper’s analysis was inadequate as it stands

as well. As a result of the incompleteness of these two analyses, I decided to proceed on my own,
with the hope that a unified analysis might still be possible.
On considering the disparity between the grammaticality of not every and *not some, I
made an initial proposition to explain which quantifiers can be legally negated with not. After a
whirlwind exploration of the behavior of not with a wide range of quantifiers, I settled on the
proposition that a quantifier Q can be negated by not if and only if there exists a closed,
continuous set of possible values for the size of the negated quantified set, and Q contains no other
aspect of its meaning, other than the quantifying aspect, that could also be negated. The second
qualification was added to accommodate for the somewhat aberrant interpretation of each, as
compared to the other quantifiers in this paper. Additionally, I asserted that negation of a quantifier
is also legal if the set of possible values for the size of the negated set is established unambiguously
within the discourse of the language. This provision was added to accommodate for the
grammaticality of not any, as well as the ‘unexpected’ grammaticality of not one and not a.
Support for the flavor of my approach can be found in Keenan & Stavi (1986). In a brief
discussion of what they term ‘negative determiners’, Keenan & Stavi assert that negative
determiners should be interpreted as the complement of the positive determiner without the
negation:
“In general where Q is a set of properties (a possible full NP denotation) we write Q’ for the set of those
properties which are not elements of Q. That is, Q’ =df P-Q. We may then define those functions we need
to interpret “negative” dets as follows: For every function f (from P into P*), f’ (f complement) is that
function from P into P* which sends each property s to (f(s))’. (p. 265-66)

My hypothesis can be restated in terms of this view that regards the negated quantifier as the
complement of the positive quantifier. I can say very generally that negation of a quantifier Q is
grammatical if and only if the complement of Q is a continuous set.
The approach I have presented appears to be a very intuitive theory of the behavior of not
with noun phrases. Presumably, if I follow the analysis of generalized quantifiers presented in
Barwise & Cooper (1981), where every noun phrases is treated as a quantifier, then to fully verify
my proposition, I would have to test it against every possible type of noun phrase construction. I

am confident at this point that the grammaticality of the negation of these other noun phrase types
could be straightforwardly explained using my Proposition 1. At this point, however, I do not
have the space to undergo that kind of a thorough proof.
Another interesting associated investigation would be to explore the interaction of NPnegation with focus particles, such as even, only, and just. It appears at first glance that in
general, only can only be used in coordination with NP-negation in a not...but construction (see
footnote 1), and just can be used in this construction and also between not and any (as was
discussed above). The behavior of even is a different story; it seems that even can be legally
inserted between not and any cardinal determiner. Although this also appears to be a very
interesting avenue for exploration, it is also left for a future exercise.
One possibility for implementing my hypothesis into a grammar (such as lexicalized TAG)
would be to introduce a NEG+ feature for those noun phrases that satisfy the constraints stated in
Proposition 1. The categorization of quantifiers presented in proposition 1, the idea of a
continuous complement of a quantifier, seems to be relevant only to the ability of a quantifier to be
negated. This is most likely a result of the apparent reality that only negation focuses on the
complement of a quantifier. Further exploration of this topic as a whole, based on the current
investigation, may provide additional insight into the phenomenon of noun phrase negation.
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